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Abstract
The current paper is an application of the analysis of coalition, in particular
the partition function approach, to the North East Atlantic blue whiting
ﬁshery. In an Exclusive Membership/Coalition Unanimity game, a multi-
agent, age-structured bioeconomic model simulates the behaviour of the
agents in a setting where we allow for partial cooperation between the coastal
states consisting of the European Union (EU), the Faroe Islands, Iceland, and
Norway. We ﬁnd that in a game played by the Exclusive Membership rules
a coalition among all the coastal states is unstable, and cannot be a Nash
equilibrium. Therefore, a coastal state agreement seems an unlikely outcome.
However, under the more restricted Coalition Unanimity rules, fewer coalition
structures are feasible, and the coastal state coalition becomes stable and the
noncooperative coalition structure unstable.
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1 Introduction
The blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou), a small gadoid, characterized as an oceanic
semi-pelagic species living in the North East Atlantic, is one of the most abundant ﬁsh
species in the Norwegian Sea. Being a straddling ﬁsh stock1, migrating through many
countries'exclusive economic zones (EEZs) as well as into international waters, it has
been subjected to heavy exploitation by several European nations, especially since the
late 1990s. However, due to the lack of international agreement for many years on how to
divide a total allowable catch (TAC) among the nations, there was no agreed catch limit.
This led to catches well above the advice of the International Council for the Exploration
of Sea2 (ICES), and thus the blue whiting ﬁshery was not considered sustainable.
However, on 16 December 2005, after six years of negotiations, the coastal states
consisting of the European Union (EU), the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Norway reached
an agreement on the management and allocation of the blue whiting stock, limiting the
catches of blue whiting to no more than 2 million tonnes for 2006 (Anon., 2005). A related
regulation for international waters was adopted by the North East Atlantic Fisheries
Commission3 (NEAFC) for 2006. This agreement, renewed and ratiﬁed both for 2007
and 2008, can be seen as a coalition between the coastal states, while the ﬁfth player,
1Straddling ﬁsh stocks are a special category of internationally shared ﬁshery resources that straddle
exclusive economic zones (EZZ) where states have special rights over the exploration and use of marine
resources, and adjacent high seas. These species, usually targeted by both coastal states and distant
water ﬁshing nations, became increasingly disputed after the establishment of exclusive economic zones
by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Anon., 1982).
2The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, ICES, is an independent, scientiﬁc
organization that advises regional ﬁsheries organizations, the European Union, and other countries
around the North Atlantic on the marine environment and its resources. ICES consists of three advisory
committees; one on ﬁsheries management (ACFM), one on marine environment (ACME), and one on
ecosystems (ACE). The Advisory Committee on Fisheries Management collects scientiﬁc background
material and oﬀers annual advice on the catches of important ﬁsh species in the North Atlantic. Based
on the advice given, the involved countries negotiate annual quotas and other management measures for
the ﬁsh stocks.
3The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, NEAFC, is intended to serve as a forum for
consultation, exchange of information on ﬁsh stocks and the management of these, and advise on the
ﬁsheries in the high seas areas mentioned in the convention on which the commission is based. Since
most of the ﬁsheries are within the jurisdiction of the coastal states, NEAFC has no real management
responsibilities beyond the fraction of the ﬁsh stocks located within the high seas areas covered by the
convention (Bjørndal, 2008).
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Russia, not recognized as a coastal state by the others, is excluded from participating in
a coastal state agreement on the management of this ﬁshery.
The United Nations (Anon., 1995) calls for for the management of straddling/highly
migratory ﬁsh stocks to be carried out through regional ﬁsheries management organiza-
tions (RFMOs), to involve both the coastal states and the distant water ﬁshing nations
(DWFNs) (Bjørndal and Munro, 2003). Membership in an RFMO is open to any nation
with real interest in the relevant ﬁsheries, both coastal states and DWFNs. The term
'real interest' is not deﬁned in the Fish Stocks Agreement, but can be taken to include
nations currently engaged in exploitation of the ﬁsheries; DWFNs which are not currently
engaged in exploiting the ﬁsheries, but which have done so in the past, and would like to
re-enter the ﬁsheries; DWFNs which have never exploited the ﬁsheries, but which would
like to enter. The blue whiting agreement does not follow this rule, as membership is for
coastal states exclusively. Although membership in NEAFC is open to all nation with
real interest in the blue whiting ﬁshery, NEAFC adopts only management measures for
the high seas based on what the coastal states set aside to be divided among all nations
with real interest in the ﬁshery, both coastal states and DWFNs.
Moreover, in the context of straddling ﬁsh stock management through RFMOs,
externalities are generally present. In fact, as these organizations tend to adopt
conservative management strategies, nonmembers are typically better oﬀ when more
players become members, as free-rider strategies can be adopted. Therefore, when a
player joins an RFMO it generally creates a positive externality for nonmembers. The
purpose of this paper is to investigate the incentives of the coastal states for forming
coalitions in the ﬁrst place, and, in the second, the stability of these coalitions after they
have been formed. To do so we use the framework of economic coalition formation in the
presence of externalities.
The current paper is an application of Pintassilgo's (2003) framework to the North
East Atlantic blue whiting ﬁshery. What separates it from Pintassilgo's work is the
number of players, and thus the number of coalition structures, and instead of focusing
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on full cooperation in an Open Membership game, we consider the possibility of
partial cooperation in an Exclusive Membership/Coalition Unanimity game. The Open
Membership game is designed to describe an institutional environment in which an
outsider can join an existing coalition if it is willing to abide by its rules, without further
consent of its existing members. Under the Exclusive Membership game, on the other
hand, consent of the existing members is required for an outsider to join a coalition. In
the Coalition Unanimity game, the formation, expansion or merger of coalitions require
the unanimous approval of the prospective members (Yi, 2003).
We ﬁnd that in a game played by the Exclusive Membership rules, a coalition among
all the coastal states is unstable and cannot be a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, a coastal
state agreement seems an unlikely outcome in the ﬁrst place. However, under the more
restricted Coalition Unanimity rules, fewer coalition structures are feasible, and the
coastal state coalition becomes stable and the noncooperative coalition structure unstable.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the development of the blue
whiting ﬁshery and management. Section 3 outlines an age structured bioeconomic model
of the ﬁshery. In Section 4, we discuss the games and the rules of the game and deﬁne
some fundamental concepts regarding stability. In Section 5, the game is applied to the
blue whiting ﬁshery. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Development of the blue whiting ﬁshery and its
management
This section reviews the development of the blue whiting ﬁshery from its beginning in the
early 1970s until present. Furthermore, the process leading to the coastal state agreement
on the management of the stock is discussed.
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2.1 The blue whiting ﬁshery
The blue whiting stock in the Northeast Atlantic migrating between the spawning areas
west of the British Isles and south of the Faroe Islands and the feeding areas in Norwegian
Sea straddles both high seas waters is, in principle, accessible to ﬁshermen from every
country, and the EEZs of several countries, the most important being the EU, the Faroe
Islands, Iceland, and Norway. The map, Figure (1) names important places in relation to
the blue whiting, and later Figure (3) shows the spawning areas and distribution pattern
along with the migration routes. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, vessels from the Soviet
Union started exploiting blue whiting in the Norwegian Sea (Bailey, 1982). The species
was not listed separately in ICES's catch statistics until 1970, but for the ﬁrst half of
the 1970s this was somewhat incomplete (Monstad, 2004). Norway started experimental
ﬁshing with pelagic trawls in the spawning area in 1972. In the following years the
technology of pelagic ﬁshing developed rapidly, with larger vessels, more powerful engines
and larger trawls ﬁtted with acoustic devices, resulting in larger catches. From annual
catches of 100 thousand tonnes in the ﬁrst half of the 1970s, the landings more than
doubled from year to year in the second half of the decade, reaching a maximum of more
than 1.1 million tonnes in 1979-1980.
However, a few years later the landings were only half of this. After that the catches
again started increasing and reached a new local maximum of about 900 thousand tonnes
in 1986 (see Figure (2)). Then the ﬁshery went into another decline, reaching its minimum
of less than 400 thousand tonnes landed in 1991. Since then the landings steadily
increased, until they suddenly increased from about 650 thousand tonnes in 1996 to 1.1
million tonnes the next year and continued increasing from then on more or less steadily
to about 2.4 million tonnes in 2004 (ICES, 2005).
This rapid increase in the landings is linked to changes in the environmental conditions
in the Northeast Atlantic, especially in the spawning period, described by Hátún et
al. (2007), but also to favourable living conditions for the blue whiting throughout its
4
 Figure 1: Map showing places referred to in the text (Bailey, 1982).
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Figure 2: Landings from the main ﬁsheries, 1970-2006 (adjusted from Monstad (2004)).
distribution area (Monstad, 2004). The explanation for the changes in distribution and
abundance is not simple, and it is likely that a combination of several factors caused these
changes.
Apart from the Russian Federation (former Soviet Union) and Norway, which
developed the ﬁshery, the blue whiting was mainly ﬁshed by vessels from the Faroe
Islands and countries of the European Union. Only minor ﬁshing was carried out by
Icelandic vessels until the mid-1990s, when a new Icelandic ﬁshery was initiated by a
ﬂeet of powerful vessels (Pálsson, 2005). As a consequence, the Icelandic catches of blue
whiting increased rapidly, reaching 501 thousand tonnes in 2003.
To be able to ﬁsh blue whiting in the waters of other countries, the nations have
negotiated bilateral quotas within the various zones4. Due to the lack of agreed sharing
of the quota, the negotiations did not consider the recommended TAC. In addition,
each country allowed for unlimited landings from its own as well as from international
waters. As a result, the actual harvest in 2001 was in fact almost three times more than
4This can be seen as a sort of what Munro (1979) called side-payments, or transfer payments in Clark
(1990), page 158-164. Side-payments are essentially transfers, monetary or non-monetary, between and
among players.
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recommended by ICES (ICES, 2003).
2.2 The management
As the landings of blue whiting grew to signiﬁcant quantities, it became clear that
international agreement was needed on how to share this resource among the nations
involved. The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, NEAFC, organized a series
of meetings to this end, including workshops, discussions and negotiations. However,
despite two years of such meetings in the early 1990s, when the matter was thoroughly
dealt with, no agreement was reached on how to share the Total Allowable Catch (TAC),
i.e., the quota recommended by NEAFC on the basis of advice from ICES (Monstad,
2004).
The various countries involved have presented diﬀerent ways to show the biological
zonal attachment of blue whiting (Ekerhovd, 2003). Some countries use the concept of
biomass by time within their zones (stock size within a zone multiplied with the duration
of the stay) (Monstad, 2004), while others exclusively employ the catch statistics from
the zone as the basic concept (Ekerhovd, 2003). A combination of these two methods is
also used, and in some cases also the inclusion of factors such as economic dependence
on the ﬁshery. In the 2000-2001 coastal state meetings and in NEAFC (Ekerhovd, 2003),
the relevant parties presented demands for their share along with what they thought the
others' shares should be, resulting in a sum of national claims amounting to almost 180%
of a possible TAC (Standal, 2006).
The process was put aside until 1998, when NEAFC set up a Working Group to deal
with the issue and present suggestions for a solution. The Working Group consisted
of representatives from the coastal states, i.e., states that have the blue whiting stock
occurring within their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). These are the EU, Norway,
Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland (formally represented by Denmark). The
Russian Federation (Russia) is also included, although not regarded as a coastal state
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by the others, but in any case it is a major participant in the blue whiting ﬁsheries
(Ekerhovd, 2003).
A great deal of work was carried out in this process. All the available relevant data
were analyzed and used as a basis for discussion and negotiation. In spite of this and the
urgent need for management measures to regulate the blue whiting ﬁsheries, an agreement
was not reach until late 2005.
However, in December 2005 the coastal states consisting of the EU, the Faroe Islands,
Iceland, and Norway signed an agreement. The agreement, starting in 2006, includes a
long term management strategy that implies annual reductions in the landings until the
management goals are reached (Anon., 2006). This arrangement provided for catches in
2006 of 2 million tonnes, allocated as follows: the EU 30.5%, the Faroe Islands 26.125%,
Norway 25.745% and Iceland 17.63%. Russia will be accommodated by transfers from
some of the coastal states and additional catches in the NEAFC area (ICES, 2007).
An interesting aspect of this agreement is how the ﬁshermen's organizations were
instrumental in preparing the ground for the agreement. During the summer of 2005,
prior to the coastal state agreement, various ﬁshermen's organizations from the European
Union, Iceland, and Norway negotiated and signed an agreement, similar to the one signed
by oﬃcials from the coastal states later that year5.
3 The bioeconomic model
In this section the three basic components of a bioeconomic model are discussed: the
production function, the population dynamics, and the economic sub-model.
5Source: A radio interview with the president of the Norwegian Fishing Vessel Owner's Association,
Mr. Sigurd Teige, transmitted by the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK), 16th December 2005.
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3.1 The harvest production function
Our model encompasses age groups, aged from one-year-old recruits to ﬁsh of 10 years
and older. The age groups are harvested simultaneously by applying a ﬂeet-speciﬁc
ﬁshing mortality fa,y,i to all age groups. The catch rate for each ﬂeet i is governed by
two parameters, the eﬀort, Xi, and the catchability coeﬃcient, qa,y, where a denotes the
age group and y the ﬁshing season. This is a version of the classical Schaefer (1957)
production function, which assumes proportionality between eﬀort and ﬁshing mortality.
The selectivity of the pelagic trawls used in the blue whiting ﬁshery is one for all age
groups, meaning that the gear catches ﬁsh indiscriminately of size or age. The reason
for this lack of age-speciﬁc escapement from the gear is that in the opening of the trawl,
which covers a huge area of water, the mesh size is quite large, several meters in fact,
while at the other end where the ﬁsh ﬁnally end up the mesh size is much smaller, about
50 mm. Furthermore there are one or two extra nets outside the ﬁsh end to prevent it
from breaking due to the increased pressure generated when the swim bladder expands
as the ﬁsh is forced to the surface. Thus, any age-speciﬁc catchabilty coeﬃcient other
than one indicates that the age group composition in the area where the ﬁsh is caught
diﬀers from the age group composition for the entire stock.
The abundance of each age group in landings from speciﬁc areas varies over time and is
governed by many factors. The age distribution of the landings is not uniform across the
age groups. Instead we stylize the catchability coeﬃcients based on assumptions about the
age distribution for each area that seems reasonable. In the ﬁrst two quarters of the year,
the stock is either migrating towards or already in the spawning areas. Therefore, the
catchability coeﬃcients for quarter one and two are set equal to the age speciﬁc proportion
of the maturity ogive; that is, the age distribution of the harvest is equal to the age
distribution in the spawning stock biomass. In the third quarter, the stock has ﬁnished
spawning and has migrated to the feeding areas in the Norwegian Sea. As the older
individuals start the migration earlier and travel farther than the younger ones (Bailey,
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Table 1: Blue Whiting: Quarterly age speciﬁc selectivity in catches
Age 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+
First quarter 0.11 0.40 0.82 0.86 0.91 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Second quarter 0.11 0.40 0.82 0.86 0.91 0.94 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Third quarter 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.25 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Fourth quarter 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1982), they spread too much on their migration to be caught. Furthermore, younger
individuals are reported being over-represented in the landings from the Norwegian Sea
during summer (Heino, 2006). Therefore, the catchability coeﬃcients of the third quarter
are set to unity for the younger age groups, while held at a lower level for the older ones.
In the fourth quarter we assume that the entire stock congregates before starting the
migration back to the spawning grounds. This results in a uniform age distribution equal
to one. The catchability coeﬃcients are shown in Table (1). Note that the qa,ys distribute
the overall ﬁshing eﬀort across the diﬀerent age groups.
3.2 Population dynamics
All age classes are subject to natural mortality, m, which is set to 0.2 for all age groups
(ICES, 2007). It is assumed that only the older component of the population (from age
class 7 on) is fully mature, whereas the younger age classes are only partially mature.
The values for the maturityogive, given in Table (2), were estimated by the 1994 Blue
Whiting Working Group (ICES, 1995). The estimate of the maturity ogive deﬁnes the
proportion of the mature individuals in the age class as constant average, MOa, for each
age class. The annual spawning stock biomass is then given by
SSBt =
10+∑
a=1
MOaWaNa,t. (1)
where Wa is the individual weight in kilograms at age a (ICES, 2007), shown in Table
(2), and Na,t is number of individuals in age group a in year t.
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Table 2: Blue whiting: proportion of maturation, weight at age, and numbers at age
2000-2006.
Age Proportion Number of ﬁsh†
group mature Weight‡ 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1 0.11 0.049 39,743.1 62,497.4 45,631.2 48,220.4 33,551.6 24,040.7 1,141.0
2 0.40 0.075 16,963.6 30,681.3 47,661.7 35,374.2 33,551.6 25,544.5 18,435.0
3 0.82 0.102 16,123.1 11,916.0 21,291.1 33,737.2 25,251.3 25,948.5 18,369.9
4 0.86 0.125 12,150.7 9,579,3 6,932.3 12,869.4 2,069.6 14,962.8 15,955.9
5 0.91 0.147 3,813.6 6,318.9 4,784.9 3,602.6 6,808.6 10,467.8 7,862.8
6 0.94 0.168 909.8 1,985.9 3,153.4 2,463.2 1,835.3 3,252.9 5,220.1
7 1.00 0.185 435.0 409.8 875.3 1,427.3 1,141.5 761.2 1,440.2
8 1.00 0.200 207.4 196.0 180.6 396.2 661.6 473.5 337.0
9 1.00 0.222 138.7 93.4 86.4 81.8 183.6 274.4 209.6
10+ 1.00 0.254 384.3 235.6 145.0 104.7 86.4 112.0 171.1
†Numbers in millions
‡Weights in kilogram per individual
The stock in the beginning of the ﬁrst quarter each year is equal to the recruitment
to the youngest cohort plus the ﬁsh that survived the last quarter the previous year.
The well known stock-recruitment relationships of Beverton-Holt (2) and Ricker (3)
(Hillborn and Walters, 1992) turned out to be diﬃcult to estimate, using the available
data from 1981 to 2006 (ICES, 2007). That is, most of the parameters, shown in Tables
(3) and (4), respectively, turned out insigniﬁcant, the estimations explained very little
of the variation in the data, and the observations were serially correlated. Instead,
a serially correlated stock-recruitment relationship, estimated on the recruitment from
1981 to 2006, reported in ICES (2007), was used in linking the number of recruits, Rt,
to the previous year's recruitment, Rt−1. An explanation for this relationship is that the
recruitment is mainly dependent on various environmental factors, such that a possible
stock-recruitment relationship drowns in the noise. In addition, the serial correlation we
found indicates that good, or bad environmental conditions occur at least two years in a
row.
Rt =
α× SSBt−1
β + SSBt−1
(2)
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Table 3: Beverton-Holt stock-recruitment relationship, ﬁtted to data from 1981-2006
(ICES, 2007).
Parameters∗ α β
Values 35329.5 3845.5
Standard Errors 34966.1 6551.5
R2adjusted 0.02
Durbin-Watson test statistic 0.76
∗Estimated by a non-linear regression.
Table 4: Ricker stock-recruitment relationship, ﬁtted to data from 1981-2006 (ICES,
2007).
Parameters α β
Values 1.999 17525.2
Standard Errors 0.423 15422.1∗
R2adjusted -0.0049
Durbin-Watson test statistic 0.77
∗The standard error of β was estimated by a non-linear regression.
Rt = SSBt−1 × exp (α(1− SSBt−1/β)) (3)
Running this serially correlated recruitment process, starting from any initial
recruitment level, the recruitment will converge to a certain recruitment level given the
parameter values, and this level is independent of the ﬁshing eﬀort applied. This means
that the steady state recruitment of the serially correlated recruitment process with the
parameter values presented in Table (5) will be about 21.5 billion individuals entering the
ﬁshable stock in steady state. This recruitment level is relatively strong if we compare
it with the average recruitment of the period 1981-1995, which was less than 10 billion
recruits, but moderate if we compare it with the average recruitment of about 36 billion for
the years 1996-2005. Such a strong and reliable recruitment would lead to an unrealistic
and over-optimistic valuation of the stock and leave us with the impression that the stock
can sustain a very high ﬁshing eﬀort indeﬁnitely. In order to compensate for this and in
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spite of the fact that we were unable to establish any stock-recruitment relationship, we
let the recruitment process be dependent on the spawning stock biomass, as follows.
In 1998, ICES's Advisory Committee on Fisheries Management (ACFM) deﬁned limit
and precautionary reference points for this stock as follows. Blim (1.5 mill. t.), Bpa (2.25
mill. t.), Flim (0.51) and Fpa (0.32) (ICES, 1998)
6. The advice of ACFM in the following
years has been given within a framework deﬁned by these reference points (ICES, 2003).
Note that we do not treat the reference points as something that the countries have
agreed upon (Lindroos, 2004b), but rather as a biological feature of the stock, and that
ﬁshing could continue even when the spawning stock is below Blim.
As long as SSB is greater or equal to Bpa we let the recruitment follow the serially
correlated process Rt = α + β × Rt−1. If SSB falls below Bpa but stays above Blim
the recruitment is ﬁxed at α and 5113.6 million individuals are recruited annually.
Further reduction of SSB below Blim leads to partial recruitment failure, with recruitment
dropping to only 500 million recruits annually. Hence
Rt =

500, if SSBt−1 < Blim
α, if Blim ≤ SSBt−1 < Bpa
α+ β ×Rt−1, otherwise.
(4)
6The ICES approach is that for stocks and ﬁsheries to be within safe biological limits, there should
be a high probability that spawning stock biomass (SSB) is above a limit Blim, where recruitment is
impaired or the dynamics of the stock are unknown, and that ﬁshing mortality is below a value Flim
that will drive the spawning stock to that biomass limit. Because of the occurrence of error in the
annual estimation of F and SSB, operational reference points are required to take account of such error.
ICES therefore deﬁned the more conservative reference points Bpa and Fpa (the subscript pa stands for
precautionary approach) as the operational thresholds. If a stock is estimated to be above Bpa there is
a high probability that it will be above Blim and similarly if F is estimated to be below Fpa there is a
low probability that F is higher than Flim. The reference values Blim and Flim are used for calculation
purposes in order to arrive at Bpa and Fpa, the operational values that should have a high probability of
being sustainable, based on the history of the ﬁshery. Stocks above Bpa and below Fpa are considered
to be inside safe biological limits. Stocks both below Bpa and above Fpa are considered to be outside
safe biological limits, and stocks that are above Fpa but also above Bpa are considered to be harvested
outside safe biological limits: in both cases action is required to bring them inside safe biological limits
(ICES, 2002).
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The parameter values in Equation (4) are shown in Table (5).
The empirical foundation for what will happen to the recruitment if the spawning
stock biomass is severely reduced is weak. Over the period from 1981 to 2006 an SSB
below Blim has hardly been observed, was reported to be less than Bpa only a few times,
and certainly did not collapse.
In 2001, ACFM stated that (our italics)
the stock is considered to be outside safe biological limits. In recent years the stock
has rapidly declined. SSB is estimated to have been at Bpa in 2000 and will be close to
Blim in 2001. Fishing mortality has increased from around the proposed Fpa in 1997, to
well above Fpa in 1998 and 1999, and well above Flim in 2000. Total landings in 2000
were 1.4 million t, far above the ICES recommended catch of 800 000 t. Landings in 2000
mainly consisted of the strong 1996 and 1997 year classes. The strength of incoming year
classes is unknown. ICES recommends that the ﬁshery in 2002 for blue whiting in all
areas be closed until a rebuilding plan has been implemented (ICES, 2003).
In 2002, ACFM stated that (our italics)
the stock is harvested outside safe biological limits. The spawning stock biomass for
2001 at the spawning time (April) is inside safe biological limits while the SSB for 2002
is expected to be below Bpa. Fishing mortality has increased rapidly in recent years, and
was estimated at 0.82 for 2001. Total landings in 2001 were almost 1.8 million t. The
incoming year classes seem to be strong. ICES recommends that the ﬁshing mortality be
less than Fpa = 0.32, corresponding to landings of less than 600 000 t in 2003.
Implementation of a rebuilding plan, however, was no longer necessary since, according
to the new assessment, the state of the stock was better than previously estimated.
The above illustrates the diﬃculty of predicting the development of a ﬁsh stock and
also that the period we are dealing with can be regarded as extraordinary. In hindsight,
and in spite of the high and increasing ﬁshing mortality of this period, the SSB is
estimated to have been about 4.3 million tonnes in 2000, about 4.6 million tonnes in 2001,
and increasing until at least 2005. However, evidence from other heavily exploited ﬁsh
14
Table 5: Recruitment function parameters for the blue whiting, estimated over the period
1981-2006 (ICES, 2007).
Parameters α β
Values 5113.57 0.76
Standard Errors 3790.41 0.14
R2adjusted 0.56
Durbin-Watson test statistic 1.51
stocks suggests that sustained harvesting outside what is considered safe biological limits
will eventually lead to recruitment failure and stock collapse, although under favourable
environmental conditions it may take some time for this to become evident. Hence, we
have decided to follow the biologists in assuming that a low SSB and a high ﬁshing
mortality indicates that the stock is harvested outside safe biological limits that will
eventually end in a recruitment failure.
Harvest within a certain year is modelled sequentially. That is, the blue whiting
stock migrates through diﬀerent waters during a year, see the map in Figure (3) (cf.
Figure (1)), and is available for harvest in diﬀerent proportions in the EEZs and the
high seas areas in the North East Atlantic, depending on the season. The model is
divided into quarterly seasons, and Table (6) shows the quarterly shares, Si,y (where
i = EU,FO, IS,NO,NEAFC and y denotes the season), of the stock attached to the
diﬀerent waters.
In the ﬁrst quarter of the year, we assume that the blue whiting stock has migrated to
waters west of Ireland and Great Britain and that 50% of the stock is available for harvest
by vessels from the member countries of the European Union within the EEZs around
Ireland and Great Britain. Meanwhile, ﬁshing vessels from non-EU member countries, as
well as EU vessels, can harvest on the remaining stock biomass in international waters
beyond the EU's EEZ.
In the second quarter, the blue whiting population has migrated to the spawning
grounds located within the EEZs of the EU and the Faroe Islands and is assumed to be
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Figure 3: Map summarizing the migration pattern and areas of concentration of adult
blue whiting (Bailey, 1982).
equally divided between the two zones and only available for harvesting by vessels from
the EU and the Faroe Islands. Meanwhile, the vessels from the other blue whiting ﬁshing
nations are excluded from participating in the ﬁshery on the spawning grounds, which
are assumed to be within the EEZs of the EU and the Faroe Islands.
In the third quarter, the remaining part of the stock spreads out into the feeding
areas in the Norwegian Sea, and is thus available for harvesting in the EEZs of Norway,
Iceland, and the Faroe Islands, while the EU and Russia only harvest the blue whiting
in the high seas areas. We assume that most of the stock (90%) has left Faroes waters
and is distributed with 25% in both international waters and the Icelandic EEZ. The
remaining 40% is found in Norwegian waters. The reason for assuming that the stock is
more concentrated in Norwegian waters is that Norway has, or claims, jurisdiction not
only over the 200 nautical miles zone surrounding mainland Norway, but also over the
200 nm zone around the island Jan Mayen and over the ﬁshery protection zone around
the Svaldbard (Spitzbergen) archipelago. Combined, these waters cover a signiﬁcant part
of the blue whiting summer feeding area.
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Table 6: Quarterly zonal attachment of the blue whiting stock in %
First quarter Second quarter Third quarter Fourth quarter
NEAFC RA 50 25 20
European Community 50 50
Faroe Islands 50 10 25
Iceland 25 20
Norway 40 35
In the fourth and last quarter, the blue whiting is still present in the Norwegian Sea,
but the stock is now distributed with 20% in the EEZ of Iceland and the high seas areas
in the Norwegian Sea. The Faroese share of the stock has risen to 25%, while Norway's
share has declined by ﬁve percentage points to 35%. The EU and Russia still have to ﬁsh
on the high seas.
The numbers of ﬁsh at the beginning of a season that have survived last quarter's
harvest and avoided death by natural causes, are given as (dropping the year subscript
t)
Na,y =Na,y−1
{
SNEAFC,y−1e−[m/4+qa,y−1
P
iXi]
+
∑
j
Sj,y−1e−[m/4+qa,y−1Xj ]
}
,
(5)
where i = EU,FO, IS,NO,RU , and j = EU,FO, IS,NO.
Ignoring the possibility of side-payments (Munro, 1979), i.e., unilateral quota
swapping that allows foreign vessels to ﬁsh blue whiting inside other nations' exclusive
economic zones (EEZs), we assume that the vessels ﬁsh in their respective EEZs and
in the high seas areas, the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission Regulatory Area,
referred to as NEAFC (RA). Although, the unilateral quota swapping is not insigniﬁcant,
and some nations ﬁsh an extensive part of their blue whiting landings in other waters
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Table 7: Validation of the model.†
Fleets
Year EU FO IS NO RU Total
2000
Observed 86,240 138,473 260,184 552,612 211,541 1,249,050
Fitted 86,239.7 138,472.8 260,183.0 552,611.7 211,540.8 1,249,048.0
Eﬀort 0.0103 0.0189 0.0364 0.0570 0.0473
2001
Observed 157,575 189,950 365,099 496,980 315,586 1,525,190
Fitted 157,574.2 189,949.5 365,098.5 496,979.5 315,585.8 1,525,187.0
Eﬀort 0.0167 0.0226 0.0429 0.0465 0.0607
2002
Observed 180,069 205,420 286,420 558,068 298,367 1,528,344
Fitted 180,068.5 205,419.5 286,418.9 558,067.8 298,367.1 1,528,342.0
Eﬀort 0.0160 0.0208 0.0291 0.0428 0.0489
2003
Observed 307,832 335,504 501,494 851,396 360,160 2,356,386
Fitted 307,831.0 335,503.8 501,493.4 851,395.7 360,160.3 2,356,384.0
Eﬀort 0.0239 0.0315 0.0465 0.0606 0.0533
2004
Observed 358,517 322,319 422,078 957,734 346,762 2,407,410
Fitted 358,516.0 322,318.4 422,076.9 957,733.3 346,761.6 2,404,406.0
Eﬀort 0.0268 0.0298 0.0393 0.0650 0.0506
2005
Observed 376,308 265,574 265,886 738,599 332,240 1,978,607
Fitted 376,307.3 265,573.5 265,885.2 738,597.9 332,239.5 1,978,603.0
Eﬀort 0.0304 0.0271 0.0282 0.0563 0.0539
2006
Observed 293,730 327,421 314,769 642,452 329,454 1,907,826
Fitted 293,729.5 327,420.6 314,768.3 642,451.4 329,454.0 1,907,824.0
Eﬀort 0.0289 0.0435 0.0452 0.0702 0.0697
†Landings in tonnes.
than their own EEZs, the exchange has a tendency to go both ways so that the net eﬀect
evens out. Moreover, some 25-35% of the total landings of blue whiting in the period
200-2006 were caught in the NEAFC regulatory areas.
In order to validate the model and the parameter values presented in Tables (1), (2)
and (6) we have tried to reproduce the national landings between 2000 and 2006, ﬁtting
the model to the observed landings by choosing the eﬀort such that it minimizes the error
squared. The results of this ﬁt are presented in Table (7).
The ﬂeets are allowed to ﬁsh within their nation's EEZ and in international waters.
The eﬀorts presented in Table (7) are held ﬁxed within a speciﬁc year. As we can see,
the diﬀerences between the observed landings and the harvests of the model are small,
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suggesting that the model using the listed parameter values is able to give a fairly accurate
description of the ﬁshery.
3.3 Economic model
ICES's ACFM Northern pelagic and blue whiting working group has conducted surveys,
and published reports on the development of the blue whiting stock. Data available on the
economics of the blue whiting ﬁshery, on the other hand, is scarce, not at all structured,
disperse and not consistent. The exception is the Norwegian revenue surveys, collected
by the Directorate of Fisheries 1991-2004, where data from vessels targeting blue whiting
along with several other important species are published (Ekerhovd, 2007). Due to the
severe data constraints, we build the model and determine intuitively those parameters
that cannot be estimated for lack of data. It is then possible to test the sensitivity of the
objective function to changes in these parameters.
The proﬁts earned by the diﬀerent national ﬂeets during a quarter of the year are as
follows (dropping the year subscript t)
pii,y =pXi
10+∑
a=1
qa,yNa,ywa
[
Sj,y(1− e−[m/4+qa,yXi])
m/4 + qa,yXi
+
SNEAFC,y(1− e−[m/4+qa,y
P
iXi])
m/4 + qa,y
∑
iXi
]
− ciXi,
(6)
where i = EU,FO, IS,NO,RU , and j = EU,FO, IS,NO.
Here X is purely notational, and the only modes of cooperation observed are where
the countries compete against each other, i.e., no cooperation at all, or full cooperation
among the coastal states with Russia as a nonmember. However, there are several possible
ways in which the countries can engage in partial cooperation that are not observed in
real life. Nevertheless, these intermediate, and hypothetical levels of cooperation are
important in ﬁnding the Nash equilibrium in a coalition game. Hence, to be able to
proceed with this analysis, we need a consistent method of ﬁnding cost parameters for
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Table 8: Cost parameters.
Coalition cost parametre†
Coalition Structure CS 3CS 2CS 2CS EU FO IS NO RU X∞
Sole-Owner 6735 0.13010
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 6585 1565 0.10630
(EU,FO,IS),(NO),(RU) 5903 3156 1770 0.08994
(EU,FO,NO),(IS),(RU) 6540 2586 1770 0.08994
(EU,IS,NO),(FO),(RU) 6064 3301 1770 0.08994
(FO,IS,NO),(EU),(RU) 5845 3270 1770 0.08994
(EU,FO),(IS),(NO),(RU) 4745 2695 3335 1735 0.07855
(EU,IS),(FO),(NO),(RU) 3676 2673 2869 1050 0.07060
(EU,NO),(FO),(IS),(RU) 4222 2673 2322 1050 0.07060
(FO,IS),(EU),(NO),(RU) 3493 2856 2869 1502 0.07060
(FO,NO),(EU),(IS),(RU) 4039 2856 2322 1502 0.07060
(IS,NO),(EU),(FO),(RU) 4296 3478 3133 1736 0.07855
(EU,FO),(IS,NO),(RU) 5046 4320 1770 0.08994
(EU,IS),(FO,NO),(RU) 4470 4895 1770 0.08994
(EU,NO),(FO,IS),(RU) 5107 4258 1770 0.08994
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU) 3451 3096 2673 3314 1710 0.06987
†The costs are in million NOK.
every coalition under every imaginable coalition structure; as follows: Assuming that all
ﬂeets apply an eﬀort, X∞, that results in a minimum recruitment such that the minimum
stock level is reached after 35 years. Having done this, we found cost parameters such
that the sum of the present value of the costs equals the sum of the present value of the
revenue. Since most vessels also have important activities targeting other species, ﬁxed
costs were not considered. A criticism of this procedure is that in open access, the stock
will be ﬁshed down to a break-even level in the long run, but in the meantime there
will be some proﬁt due to a large stock. However, we let this proﬁt be absorbed by the
costs. Our goal here is not to ﬁnd the inter-marginal proﬁt of open access, but intuitively
determine those coeﬃcients that cannot be estimated for lack of data. When calibrating
the cost parameters we use the age composition of 2000 as initial stock. The resulting
cost parameters are shown in Table (8).
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4 The Game
A straddling stock ﬁshery usually involves many countries and ﬂeets. The analysis of
games in which the number of players exceeds two requires analysis of coalitions. A
coalition means a subset of the set of players. Two or more countries are considered to
form a coalition if they ratify (or sign) a mutual agreement on the particular ﬁshery.
Three types of coalition scenarios may result. If all parties concerned sign the
agreement, the situation is denoted full cooperation, and a grand coalition is said to
be formed. If some countries are left outside the agreement, the situation is denoted
partial cooperation, and the outsiders may act as free riders. Finally, in the case of
noncooperation there are no agreements between the countries, and each is only interested
in maximizing individual beneﬁts from the ﬁshery.
Based on the three possible outcomes described above, a characteristic function of
the game can be established. The characteristic function assigns a value to each possible
coalition. The value in the case of straddling ﬁsh stocks is, generally, interpreted as the
net present value of the ﬁshery to a certain coalition.
The value for coalition members depends on the particular behaviour of nonmembers.
The assumption made in this paper is that nonmembers of the grand coalition can
either form smaller coalitions, or act as singleton, and adopt individually best-response
strategies against other coalitions. This results in a Nash equilibrium between the
coalitions.
Characteristic function games have been applied to straddling stock ﬁsheries since the
late 1990s (Kaitala and Lindroos, 1998; Arnason et al., 2001; Lindroos and Kaitala, 2001;
Lindroos 2004a; Burton, 2003; Duarte et al., 2000; Brasão et al., 2001). Nonetheless,
the framework of a characteristic function approach, although suﬃciently general to
encompass many contributions of coalition formation theory, is not fully satisfactory.
Most importantly, it ignores the possibility of externalities among coalitions, that is, the
eﬀects that coalition mergers have on the payoﬀs of players who belong to the other
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coalitions.
According to Yi (1997), the formation of economic coalitions with externalities opened
a new strand of literature on noncooperative game theory. Most studies are centred on
ﬁnding the equilibrium number and size of coalitions and share a common two-stage game
framework (Pintassilgo and Lindroos, 2008). In the ﬁrst stage players form coalitions,
whereas in the second stage coalitions compete against each other. The coalition payoﬀs
are represented by a partition function. This function assigns a value to each coalition as
a function of the entire coalition structure. Therefore, it captures the externalities across
coalitions that are assumed to be absent in the characteristic function.
The general framework of coalition ﬁsheries games has been studied in particular by
Pintassilgo (2003) who brought the theory a major leap forward. He introduced the
partition function approach to these games and hence formalized and generalized the
existing applications in the literature.
In the second stage, it is assumed that the members of the coalition act cooperatively,
by choosing a ﬁshing strategy that maximizes the net present value for the coalition, given
the strategies of the outsiders. The outsiders, or all players in the case of no cooperation,
choose the strategy that maximizes their own individual payoﬀs given the behaviour of
the other players. This noncooperative behaviour leads to a noncooperative solution for
each coalition structure, which is assumed to be unique. Thus, the coalition payoﬀs in
the second stage can be deﬁned as a partition function. This function assigns a value to
each coalition which depends on the entire coalition structure.
4.1 The Rules of the Game
Consider a two-stage game and a ﬁnite numbers of players. In the ﬁrst stage each player
has to decide whether to form a coalition with other players or act individually as a
singleton.
Two types of games, known from the literature on coalition formation, that could
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possibly be used in the blue whiting ﬁshery case are The Exclusive Membership game
and the Coalition Unanimity game (Yi, 2003). Under the Exclusive Membership7 game,
consent of the existing members is required for an outsider to join a coalition. For
example, Russia is not recognized as a coastal state by the other blue whiting ﬁshing
nations and, thus, excluded from the coalition.
Each player simultaneously announces a list of players (including itself) with whom it
is willing to form a coalition. The players that announce exactly the same list of nations
belong to the same coalition. Formally, player i's strategy αi 8 is to choose a set of players
Si (itself included), a subset of S ≡ {P1, P2, ..., PN}. Given the players' announcements
α ≡ (S1, S2, ..., SN), the resulting coalition structure is C = {B1, B2, ..., Bm}, where
players i and j belong to the same coalition Bk if and only if S
i = Sj, that is, they choose
exactly the same list of players (m is the number of diﬀerent lists chosen by the players).
In the Coalition Unanimity game, on the other hand, the formation, expansion or
merger of coalitions require the unanimous approval of the prospective members. In
the Exclusive Membership game, described above, when some members of of a coalition
leave to join and/or form other coalitions, the remaining members stay on as a smaller
coalition. Under the Coalition Unanimity rule, however, a members's departure results
in the dissolution of the coalition.
As in the Exclusive Membership game, each player announces a subset of players
(including itself) with which it is willing to form a coalition, but a coalition forms
only upon unanimous approval by the prospective members. Formally, for each n-
tuple of strategies α = (S1, S2, ..., SN), the resulting coalition structure is C =
{B1, B2, ..., Bm} where Pi ∈ Bk(= Si) if and only if Si = Sj for all Pj ∈ Si, and
Pi ∈ {Pi} otherwise. For example, suppose that there are four players and that
α = ({P1, P2, P3}, {P1, P2, P3}, {P3}, {P3, P4}). In the Exclusive Membership game,
P1 and P2 form a coalition, because they announce the same list of players. But in
7Hart and Kurz's (1983) original name is game ∆. In order to contrast this game to the Open
Membership game, this game is renamed the Exclusive Membership game (Yi, 2003).
8Do not mistake this with the α of the recruitment process.
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the Coalition Unanimity game, they stay as singleton coalitions, because P3 does not
participate in their coalition. Hence, the resulting coalition structure is {1, 1, 1, 1}9. In the
Exclusive Membership game, P2's announcement of {P1, P2, P3} signals his willingness to
form a coalition with any subset of players who are on his list. In the Coalition Unanimity
game, on the other hand, the same announcement by P2 means that he will form a
coalition with the players on his list if and only if all prospective members participate
in the coalition. In other words, upon the departure of some members of a coalition,
the remaining stay as a smaller coalition in the Exclusive Membership game, but they
dissolve their coalition and become singleton coalitions in the Coalition Unanimity game.
The ﬁve players of the blue whiting ﬁshery game, the European Union (EU), the
Faroe Islands (FO), Iceland (IS), Norway (NO), and the Russian Federation (RU), made
the following announcements:
α =({EU,FO, IS,NO}, {EU,FO, IS,NO}, {EU,FO, IS,NO},
{EU,FO, IS,NO}, {EU,FO, IS,NO,RU}).
Since the coastal states consisting of the EU, the Faroe Islands, Iceland, and Norway,
choose exactly the same list of players, they belong to the same coalition. Russia, on the
other hand, forms a one-player coalition, because it announced a list diﬀerent from the
others.
The resulting coalition structure is independent of whether the game is played by
the Exclusive Membership rule or Coalition Unanimity rule. But when it comes to the
stability of the coalition the distinction might be important. In the Exclusive Membership
game, the players can leave the coastal state coalition unilaterally to form a singleton
while the other coastal states stay on as a smaller coalition. In the presence of positive
9In this case the players are symmetric, that is, all players have the same strategy sets and payoﬀ
functions; and the identities of the players do not matter so that the interchange of players i's and j's
strategies results in the interchange of player i's and j's payoﬀs but does not aﬀect other players' payoﬀs.
Thus, a coalition is identiﬁed by its size.
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externalities, players might ﬁnd it proﬁtable to leave the coalition and act as singletons,
provided the other coastal states continue to cooperate. However, if the result of one
player leaving the coastal state coalition is the end of cooperation and all players revert
to singleton behaviour, the game is played by the Coalition Unanimity rule, and the only
way for the coastal states to realize the gains of cooperation is to engage in it.
Notice that although Russia is not accepted as a coastal state by the others, it might
also beneﬁt from the positive externalities created by the formation of a coalition among
the coastal states.
Given the partition function, which yields the equilibrium payoﬀs of the second stage
game, the equilibrium coalition structures of the ﬁrst stage game are the Nash equilibrium
outcomes of an Exclusive Membership game or a Coalition Unanimity game of coalition
formation.
It is not clear whether it is the Exclusive Membership game or the Coalition Unanimity
game that ﬁts the blue whiting case best. One could argue that a coalition among the
remaining coastal states would continue if one of them decided to leave. On the other
hand, there is little evidence of the players forming sub-coalitions before a coastal state
agreement was reached after several years of negotiations.
The coalition is said to be stable if there is no player that ﬁnds it optimal to join the
coalition (external stability) and if no player within the coalition ﬁnds it optimal to leave
the coalition (internal stability). When determining the stability properties of the grand
coalition it is suﬃcient to check for internal stability if there are no potential entrants in
the ﬁshery (Lindroos et al., 2007).
4.2 Stability of the Coalition Structures
Let us ﬁrst deﬁne some fundamentals concepts, following Pintassilgo (2003), starting with
the characteristic function.
25
Deﬁnition 1.
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be a set of players. Any subset of N is a coalition and 2N denotes the
collection of its 2n coalitions. A coalition function (or characteristic function) V : 2N → R
is a real-valued function which assigns a value V (S) to each coalition S and which satisﬁes
V (∅) = 0.
Let us continue the deﬁnitions with the notions of coalition structure and partition
function.
Deﬁnition 2.
A coalition structure C = {S1, S2, ..., Sm} is a partition of the set of players N =
{1, 2, ..., n} : Si ∩ Sj = ∅ for i 6= j and ∪mi=1Si = N .
Deﬁnition 3.
Let Ω be the set of all partitions of N . A game in partition function form speciﬁes a
coalition value, V (S,C), for every partition C in Ω and every coalition S which is an
element of C.
Let us now turn to the analysis of the presence of externalities among coalitions, in
our game. Externalities are present, in a game in coalition form, if there is at least one
coalition whose value depends on the overall coalition structure. Formally this can be
deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 4.
Externalities are present, in a game in coalition form, if and only if the following condition
is veriﬁed:
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∃S,C and C ′ ∈ Ω :
S ⊂ C and S ⊂ C ′, C 6= C ′ and V (S,C) 6= V (S,C ′)
If the change in the coalition structure corresponds to a concentration, i.e., the ﬁnal
structure can be obtained from the initial one only by merging existing coalitions, then
the externality on a nonmerging coalition can be qualiﬁed as positive (negative) if it
increases (decreases) the coalition value.
Well-known economic coalitions, such as output cartels in oligopoly and coalitions
formed to provide public goods, tend to create positive externalities on nonmember
players. In the management of straddling ﬁsh stocks, positive externalities are also
expected to be present. In fact, as the members of the regional ﬁshery organizations
tend to adopt conservative strategies, a nonmember player is typically better oﬀ the
greater the number of players that join the organization. In this scenario, an interesting
point to explore is the impact of externalities on the stability of coastal states agreements.
Let us continue by addressing the notion of stability. As the merger of players into
coalitions tends to create positive external eﬀects on the nonmembers, the analysis of
stability based on single player deviations emerges naturally. Moreover, in the context
of positive externalities, Yi (1997) refers to the concept of stand-alone stability as
being particularly useful, namely in characterizing equilibrium coalition structures. This
concept is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 5.
A coalition structure C = {S1, S2, ..., Sm} is stand alone stable if and only if
V (Sk, C) ≥
n∑
i=1
Vi(S
i, Ci), ∀i ∈ Sk, ∀k, k = 1, ...,m
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where
Si represents a singleton coalition formed only by player i, and
Ci = (C\Sk) ∪ (Sk\Si) ∪ (Si), stands for a coalition structure formed from the original
coalition structure (C), in which coalition Sk is divided into two sub-coalitions: (Sk\Si)
and (Si). In other words, player i leaves coalition Sk and forms a singleton coalition,
ceteris paribus.
A coalition is, therefore, stand-alone stable if and only if no player ﬁnds it proﬁtable to
leave its coalition to form a singleton coalition, holding the rest of the coalition structure
constant (including its former coalition). In the case of the coastal state coalition, this
occurs when no player is interested in leaving the cooperative coastal states agreement
to adopt a free-rider behaviour.
5 The Results.
This section presents the results of simulating the development of the blue whiting
ﬁshery under diﬀerent coalition structures. After the presentation of the payoﬀs a
partition function is deﬁned and the results are discussed in the context of the Exclusive
Membership game. Finally, following the sensitivity analysis, the results are discussed in
the Coalition Unanimity game context.
Table (9) presents the payoﬀs in this game from applying the constant ﬁshing eﬀort
strategy10 over a 35-year period starting in 2006, computing Nash equilibria for all the
coalition structures11. The price per kilogram of ﬁsh is NOK 0.8, and the discount rate is
set to 5%. The proﬁt-income ratios using the cost parameters in Table (8) are as follows.
For the coalition structure where all players act as singletons the ratios are 17%, 10%,
12%, 12%, and 15% for the EU, Faroe Islands, Iceland, Norway12 and Russia, respectively.
10A constant eﬀort strategy corresponds to a variable catch strategy, where catch depends positively
on the stock level. This type of strategy is especially relevant when there are signiﬁcant costs of eﬀort
adjustment, as in the presence of high ﬁxed costs or diﬃculties in transferring ﬁshing eﬀort between
diﬀerent ﬁsheries.
11Lindroos and Kaitala (2001) were the ﬁrst to compute Nash equilibria for coalition ﬁsheries games.
12The cost-price ratio in the Norwegian blue whiting ﬁshery 1998 - 2001 was estimated to be in the
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The coastal state coalition has a proﬁt-income ratio of 38%, while for Russia it is 37%.
Under sole-owner management, however, the proﬁts make up about 54% of the gross
income from the ﬁshery.
For the coalition structures where two players merge into a coalition while the others
continue as singletons we were unable to obtain unique equilibrium payoﬀ vectors. This
results in a large numbers of Nash equilibria, where the number of strategy combinations
depends on how the model is discretized and is restricted by computational capacity and
time. The reason for this is that the complexity of the bioeconomic model raises the
problem nonuniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (Lindroos and Kaitala, 2001). In order
to overcome the problems of nonuniqueness we assume that for a two-player coalition to
form, leaving the other countries as singletons, the merging countries have to gain by
such a coalition structure otherwise they would be as least as well oﬀ as singletons, so
the other countries will be initially caught in a situation where the two-player coalition
chooses the Nash equilibrium strategy that maximizes its own payoﬀ. Faced with this,
we assume the best response of the ones remaining as singletons is to choose the strategy
that maximizes its own payoﬀ given the strategy of the two-player coalition assuming
that their fellow singleton players do the same. In Table (9) we therefore present the
payoﬀs for these cases, along with the mean, maximum and minimum payoﬀs for each
coalition of the coalition structures with nonunique payoﬀ vectors. However, it is not
guaranteed that a coalition consisting of two players would be able to act as as leader
in all circumstances. As shown in Table (9), under some coalition structures the spread
of the payoﬀs is considerable, so it would be diﬃcult to tell what would be the actual
outcome if a {2,1,1,1} coalition structure were to form. Although not ideal, we use this
as an equilibrium selection criterion, and treat the solution as if it were unique.
range from 0.087 in 1998, to 0.181 in 2000, averaging 0.148 (Ekerhovd, 2003).
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Table 9: Blue Whiting Game - Payoﬀs.†
Payoﬀs - Net Present Value‡
Coalition Structure Total CS 3CS 2CS 2CS EU FO IS NO RU
Sole-Owner 7871
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 6587 3495 3093
(EU,FO,IS),(NO),(RU) 4465 1710 1306 1449
(EU,FO,NO),(IS),(RU) 4384 1696 1317 1371
(EU,IS,NO),(FO),(RU) 4654 1513 1645 1496
(FO,IS,NO),(EU),(RU) 4447 1370 1542 1536
(EU,FO),(IS),(NO),(RU) 2223 798 469 279 677
mean 2120 732 446 398 545
max 798 510 490 677
min 616 356 279 433
(EU,IS),(FO),(NO),(RU) 3199 1861 987 169 182
mean 3703 793 803 623 1484
max 1861 2068 1403 2972
min 121 49 153 180
(EU,NO),(FO),(IS),(RU) 3327 1623 1016 150 537
mean 3683 737 841 605 1501
max 1623 2068 1405 2872
min 143 46 153 176
(FO,IS),(EU),(NO),(RU) 2826 1862 67 681 216
mean 2603 788 307 702 807
max 1862 730 1255 1584
min 223 33 308 195
(FO,NO),(EU),(IS),(RU) 2510 1432 416 284 378
mean 2543 776 339 675 753
max 1432 856 1189 1387
min 282 34 252 195
(IS,NO),(EU),(FO),(RU) 3725 1093 1770 55 806
mean 2761 484 959 766 553
max 1093 1770 1137 806
min 148 337 55 438
(EU,FO),(IS,NO),(RU) 4612 1843 1256 1513
(EU,IS),(FO,NO),(RU) 4642 1644 1486 1513
(EU,NO),(FO,IS),(RU) 4483 1579 1516 1389
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU) 1997 1558∗ 606 331 351 271 439
†The initial stock as it was in 2006.
‡Values of NPV in million NOK.
∗The sum of payoﬀs from the coastal states acting as singletons.
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5.1 Partition function
From the payoﬀs presented in Table (9), it is now possible to deﬁne a partition function.
Let V ∗(CCS, CCS) denote the net return to be shared by the four members when the
coastal state coalition is formed. This is equal to the present value of the coastal state
cooperative strategy less the sum of the threat points of each member.
V ∗(CCS, CCS) = 3, 494.8− 1, 558.3 = NOK 1, 936.5 million (7)
Let the value of the players that belong to the same coalition equal the coalition value.
V (Si, Ci) =
pi(S,C)−∑i∈S pi(Si, CT )
V ∗(CCS, CCS)
,
where the notation stands for:
pi(S,C) - payoﬀ of coalition S under coalition structure C;
Si = {i} and CT = ∪ni=1Si,
i.e., Si stands for a singleton coalition formed only by player i and CT for the coalition
structure in which all players act as singletons.
Therefore, pi(Si, CT ) is the threat point of player i.
Let us also assume that player i will only be a member of coalition S if it receives a
nonnegative normalized value, i.e., its ﬁnal payoﬀ must not fall below its threat point.
Table (10) reports the partition function values and summarizes the coalition
structure's stand-alone stability.
Table (10) clearly shows that positive externalities do exist in this game:
V (EU, {(FO, IS,NO), (EU), (RU)}) = 0.48
>

V (EU, {(FO, IS), (EU), (NO), (RU)}) = −0.28
V (EU, {(FO,NO), (EU), (IS), (RU)}) = −0.10,
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Table 10: Coalition Structures, Partition Function Values, and Stand-Alone Stability.
Coalition Structure V (Sk, C) Vi(Si, Ci) Stand-Alone Stable
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) 1.00 0.48, 0.68, 0.50, 0.53 No
(EU,FO,IS),(NO),(RU) 0.22 -0.28, 0.34, 0.06 Yes
(EU,FO,NO),(IS),(RU) 0.25 -0.10, 0.35, 0.00 No
(EU,IS,NO),(FO),(RU) 0.15 0.60, -0.10, -0.05 No
(FO,IS,NO),(EU),(RU) 0.22 -0.14, -0.03, 0.21 Yes
(EU,FO),(IS),(NO),(RU)† -0.07 0, 0 No
(EU,IS),(FO),(NO),(RU)† 0.51 0, 0 Yes
(EU,NO),(FO),(IS),(RU)† 0.39 0, 0 Yes
(FO,IS),(EU),(NO),(RU)† 0.61 0, 0 Yes
(FO,NO),(EU),(IS),(RU)† 0.43 0, 0 Yes
(IS,NO),(EU),(FO),(RU)† 0.24 0, 0 Yes
(EU,FO),(NO,IS),(RU) 0.49, 0.58 0.60, -0.14, 0.00, 0.06 Yes
(EU,IS),(FO,NO),(RU) 0.98, 0.48 -0.10, -0.03, 0.34, -0.05 Yes
(EU,NO),(FO,IS),(RU) 0.88, 0.53 -0.28, 0.21, 0.35, -0.10 Yes
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU) 0, 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0, 0 Yes
†The Nash equilibrium is not unique.
V (FO, {(EU, IS,NO), (FO), (RU)}) = 0.68
>

V (FO, {(EU, IS), (FO), (NO), (RU)}) = 0.34
V (FO, {(EU,NO), (FO), (IS), (RU)}) = 0.35
V (FO, {(IS,NO), (EU), (FO), (RU)}) = −0.14,
V (IS, {(EU,FO,NO), (IS), (RU)}) = 0.50
>

V (IS, {(EU,FO), (IS), (NO), (RU)}) = 0.06
V (IS, {(FO,NO), (EU), (IS), (RU)}) = −0.03
V (IS, {(EU,NO), (EU), (FO), (RU)}) = −0.10,
and
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V (NO, {(EU,FO, IS), (NO), (RU)}) = 0.53
>

V (NO, {(EU, IS), (FO), (NO), (RU)}) = −0.05
V (NO, {(FO, IS), (EU), (NO), (RU)}) = 0.21
V (NO, {(EU,FO), (IS), (NO), (RU)}) = 0.00.
In the presences of externalities, Pintassilgo (2003) established that A suﬃcient
condition for a coalition structure not to be stand-alone stable is that the sum of the
normalized values of the singleton coalitions, resulting from unilateral deviations from
any of its coalitions, exceeds the value of that coalition (Lemma 2, page 185). In this
respect the coastal state coalition cannot be stand-alone stable. This can be seen by
calculating the sum of the values of the singleton coalitions, resulting from unilateral
deviations from the coastal state coalition.
n∑
i=1
Vi(S
i, Ci) = 0.53 + 0.50 + 0.68 + 0.48 = 2.20 > V (Sk, C) = 1.00
As the value of the unilateral deviations from the coastal state coalition exceeds unity,
it can be concluded that there is no sharing rule that can make the coastal state coalition
stand-alone stable. Therefore, the coastal state coalition cannot be a Nash equilibrium
of the Exclusive Membership game.
In order to ﬁnd the possible equilibrium coalition structures we need to ﬁnd those
that are not just stand-alone stable but also where the players ﬁnd it unproﬁtable to join
others in forming larger coalitions too.
Following Deﬁnition 5, the coalition structures {(EU,FO,IS),(NO),(RU)}, {(FO,IS,NO),
(EU),(RU)}, {(EU,IS),(FO),(NO),(RU)}, {(EU,NO),(FO),(IS),(RU)}, {(FO,IS),(EU),(NO)
,(RU)}, {(FO,NO),(EU),(IS),(RU)}, {(IS,NO),(EU),(FO),(RU)}, {(EU,FO),(NO,IS),(RU)},
{(EU,IS),(FO,NO),(RU)}, {(EU,NO),(FO,IS),(RU)} and {(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU)}
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happen to be stand-alone stable. However, it is interesting to note that none of them is
a Nash equilibrium of the Exclusive Membership game.
Regarding the {(EU,FO,IS),(NO),(RU)}, Norway has incentive to join the other
coastal states if it receives at least 0.53. As the coalition (EU,FO,IS) only receives
0.22 when Norway plays as a nonmember, and the coalition consisting of EU, the
Faroe Islands, Iceland, and Norway, with Russia as an outsider, receive 1.00, there is
here a Pareto-sanctioned movement. Likewise for the {(FO,IS,NO),(EU),(RU)}, the
EU has incentive join the coastal state coalition if it at least receives 0.48, while
the others receive 0.22 when EU plays as a nonmember. The two-player coalitions
{(EU,IS),(FO),(NO),(RU)}, {(EU,NO),(FO),(IS),(RU)}, {(FO,IS),(EU),(NO),(RU)},
and {(FO,NO),(EU),(IS),(RU)} are either better oﬀ as they are without merging with
one of the singletons to form a three-player coalition, or such a merger would not
result in beneﬁts large enough to leave all players as least as well oﬀ. What is
more attractive is for the singletons to merge and form a two-player coalition for
themselves. However, for the {(EU,IS),(FO),(NO),(RU)}, {(EU,NO),(FO),(IS),(RU)},
and {(FO,IS),(EU),(NO),(RU)} this is not a Pareto-sanctioned movement, as the ini-
tial two-player coalitions are are worse oﬀ in a {2,2,1} coalition structure. For the
{(IS,NO),(EU),(FO),(RU)}, on the other hand, Iceland and Norway are as least as
well oﬀ merging with the Faroe Islands forming a three-player coalition. This is not
a Pareto-sanctioned movement either since EU's payoﬀ as a singleton was 1770 under
the former coalition structure while only 1542 in the latter case. However, a move-
ment from {(IS,NO),(EU),(FO),(RU)} to {(EU,FO),(NO,IS),(RU)} would be a Pareto-
sanctioned improvement, as all players would be as well oﬀ in the latter case as in
the former. With regard to the {(EU,FO),(NO,IS),(RU)}, {(EU,IS),(FO,NO),(RU)}
and {(EU,NO),(FO,IS),(RU)}, the sum of the payoﬀ of the two-player coalitions is less
than the payoﬀ to the coastal states when they all cooperate. Finally, there is the
{(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU)}, which is stand-alone stable by deﬁnition, but not a Nash
equilibrium in the game. Although not necessarily a Pareto-sanctioned movement, every
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Table 11: Sensitivity Analysis.
Stand-Alone Stability
Initial Discount Cost parameters
Year Rate X∞ ci
Coalition Structure 2006 2000 4% 6% -1% +1% -10% +10%
(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU) No No No No No No No No
(EU,FO,IS),(NO),(RU) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
(EU,FO,NO),(IS),(RU) No No Yes Yes Yes No No No
(EU,IS,NO),(FO),(RU) No No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
(FO,IS,NO),(EU),(RU) Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
(EU,FO),(IS),(NO),(RU) Yes† No Yes† Yes† No† Yes† Yes† No
(EU,IS),(FO),(NO),(RU) Yes† Yes† Yes† Yes† No Yes† Yes† Yes†
(EU,NO),(FO),(IS),(RU) Yes† Yes† Yes† Yes† No Yes† Yes† Yes†
(FO,IS),(EU),(NO),(RU) Yes† Yes† Yes† Yes† No Yes† Yes† Yes†
(FO,NO),(EU),(IS),(RU) Yes† Yes† Yes† Yes† No No† Yes† No
(IS,NO),(EU),(FO),(RU) Yes† No Yes† Yes† No Yes† Yes† No
(EU,FO),(NO,IS),(RU) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
(EU,IS),(FO,NO),(RU) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(EU,NO),(FO,IS),(RU) Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(EU),(FO),(IS),(NO),(RU) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
†The Nash equilibrium is not unique.
country will be at least as well oﬀ by unilaterally merging with another country to form
a two-player coalition while the other players act as nonmembers.
Be aware that most of the results derived above, and in the following, will be
contingent on our choice of equilibria selection criteria for the coalition structures with
nonunique payoﬀ vectors. However, what is certain is that a coalition of all coastal states
is not a Nash equilibrium in the two-stage game.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
In order to check the robustness of our results to changes in initial age group abundances,
the discount rate and in the cost parameters we have performed an sensitivity analysis.
Table (11) reports the results of this. For comparison, the results in the last column of
Table (10) are repeated.
Choosing the age distribution of the stock in 2006 as initial age group abundance in
the simulations is natural because 2006 is the ﬁrst year of the blue whiting agreement,
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and investigating the stability of the coastal state coalition from this point of departure
is therefore highly relevant. However, there have been diﬃculties reaching this agreement
and the process leading up the agreement has taken several years, and so it would be of
interest to see if the prospects looked diﬀerent at the beginning of this process than at
the end of it. Therefore, Table (11), third column, presents the stand-alone properties of
simulations with 2000 as initial year, ceteris paribus. The coastal state coalition is not
stand-alone stable, and fewer coalition structures had multiple best response equilibria.
Although fewer of the coalition structures are stand-alone stable compared to 2006, one
of them, the {(EU,NO),(FO),(IS),(RU)}, is a Nash equilibrium. None of the countries
would be better oﬀ by any unilateral movement away from this coalition structure.
Next, we see that the main results are robust to small changes in the discount rate.
However, at discount rates of 4 and 6%, every coalition structure except the coastal state
coalition, is stand-alone stable. At 5% discount rate, on the other hand, the number
of stand-alone stable coalition structures is lower, indicating an ambiguous eﬀect of
discounting in a complex problem such as this.
We continue testing the robustness of the results to changes in the cost parame-
ters. Firstly, we change the eﬀort level X∞ by plus/minus one percentage point.
An increase (a decrease) in X∞ means that the stock is ﬁshed down to minimum
more rapidly (slowly). Having done this the cost parameters are re-calibrated. This
is equivalent to a reduction (an increase) in the cost parameters ceteris paribus, but
in fact change in the cost parameters are much higher than the original change
in X∞. By increasing X∞ we end up with ﬁve Nash equilibrium coalition struc-
tures, {(EU,IS),(FO,NO),(RU)}, {(EU,NO),(FO,IS),(RU)}, {(EU,FO),(NO,IS),(RU)},
{(EU,IS),(FO,NO),(RU)} and {(EU,NO),(FO,IS),(RU)} while lowering X∞ result in
fewer stand-alone stable coalition structures, fewer nonunique payoﬀ vectors and one
Nash equilibrium coalition structure: the {(EU,IS),(FO,NO),(RU)}.
Secondly, since a small change in X∞ gives large and disproportionate changes in the
cost parameters, we change, ceteris paribus, the cost parameters, ci, directly. Again we
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see that increased costs increases the number of coalition structures with a unique Nash
equilibrium, however, to a lesser extent than lowering X∞ would. When reducing the
cost of unit eﬀort by 10%, the (IS,NO),(EU),(FO),(RU) emerges as a Nash equilibrium
coalition structure.
What has become evident by this exercise is that the coastal state coalition cannot
be a Nash equilibrium of the blue whiting game under the Exclusive Membership rules.
However, under some circumstances a few other coalition structures emerged as possible
candidates for being a Nash equilibrium, but this only holds if our equilibrium selection
criteria is the correct one. Moreover, the higher the cost of ﬁshing, fewer of the coalition
structures are stand-alone stable and none is a Nash equilibrium.
5.3 Coalition Unanimity
In the light of the results reached so far, a successful coastal state agreement on the
management of the blue whiting ﬁshery seems an unlikely outcome. In spite of this an
agreement was reached in 2005, implemented in 2006, and is still in function.
One possible explanation for this is that the game is governed by the Coalition
Unanimity game rule rather than the Exclusive Membership rules. That is, there are
only two feasible coalition structures, the coastal states forming a coalition with Russia
as a singleton or no cooperation at all, as opposed to a continuum of partial cooperative
coalition structures between the two alternatives.
We have already shown, cf. Equation (7), that the coastal state cooperative agreement
has a positive present value, V ∗(CCS, CCS), under the Coalition Unanimity game rule.
Thus, imposing this restriction on the game, the {(EU,FO,IS,NO),(RU)} becomes a
stand-alone stable coalition structure and the coastal state coalition a Nash equilibrium
in the blue whiting game.
However, it is not easy to decide what type of rules are best suited for describing the
blue whiting ﬁshery game. Moreover, the conditions of the game may be changing over
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time due to changes in the natural environment such as climate change, changes in the
migration pattern or in the abundance of ﬁsh, or a successful management might attract
newcomers who start ﬁshing blue whiting on the high seas. Such factors might change
how the game should be played completely.
Then there is the question of what kind of game is it at present; a Coalition Unanimity
game or a Exclusive Membership game? The coastal states' initial claims of shares in
the ﬁshery is an argument in favour of the Exclusive Membership game in that they
all seemed to demand at least their free rider payoﬀs to be willing to cooperate. This
is exactly what made the coastal state coalition unstable in the ﬁrst place. Argument
in favour of the Coalition Unanimity game is that there is little evidence of coastal
states forming coalitions consisting of only two or three members, although there was
an extensive exchange of quotas which allowed foreign vessels to ﬁsh blue whiting inside
national EEZs, including Russia. Remember that in the Exclusive Membership game a
player was willing to form a coalition with any other player that it included in its own
announcement. The probability that the remaining members of the coastal state coalition
would continue as a smaller coalition while an individual member decides to leave the
coalition and form a singleton coalition on its own is very low. In that event, the desire
to punish the free rider becomes strong and the incentive for conservation weaker.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper applies the coalition approach to management of high seas ﬁsheries in the
presence of externalities to the North East Atlantic blue whiting ﬁshery. The international
management of this ﬁshery is conducted through the coastal states and not a regional
ﬁsheries management organization. The coastal states agree on, and divide among
themselves, a total allowable catch for the stock. A fraction of this TAC is to be ﬁshed
on high seas and is supposed to be shared by both the coastal states and distant water
ﬁshing nations. The division of the high seas shares is left to the local RFMO, the North
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East Atlantic Fisheries Commission.
In order to account for these features we focused on partial rather than full
cooperation, in particular coalitions among the coastal states. We found that, allowing
for multiple coalition structures, the coastal state coalition is not a Nash equilibrium
coalition structure. This was the outcome of the Exclusive Membership game.
This result is in line with previous studies using two-stage partition games. Pintassilgo
(2003), using an age-structured, multi-gear bioeconomic model, shows that for the
Northern Atlantic blueﬁn tuna ﬁshery, there is no sharing rule that makes the grand
coalition stable and no Nash equilibrium coalition structure exists. However, if we restrict
the number of feasible coalition structures among the coastal states, such that the game
is governed by the Unanimity Coalition game rule, the coastal state coalition becomes a
stable Nash equilibrium.
The agreement among the coastal states established in 2005 does not prove that the
blue whiting ﬁshery is best described as a Unanimity Coalition game. The process leading
up to the agreement must be said to have been both long and hard. The uncertainty
about the rules of the game and its dependency on a constantly changing environment,
both in a literal, and in a political and institutional sense, makes the long term prospects
of the agreement uncertain too. Unless the individual coastal states receive a suﬃciently
high share of the gains of cooperation, the incentives to act noncooperatively will remain
strong.
The prospects of cooperation among the coastal states are low if countries can free-
ride on the cooperative agreement. This survey has shown that it is not only distant
water ﬁshing nations and interlopers that threaten the stability of ﬁsheries agreements,
the self interests of the coastal states are a major obstacle for cooperative management
of straddling ﬁsh stocks. This is the opposite of what was used as an argument for
the establishment of exclusive economic zones in the ﬁrst place, i.e., that the tragedy
of the commons in international ﬁsheries would be virtually eliminated as 90% of the
world's ﬁsheries resources would become subject to national jurisdiction. Furthermore,
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the shortcomings of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas soon became
evident; as a signiﬁcant part of the ﬁsheries moved to international waters in response
to the extension of national jurisdiction. The United Nations Fish Stock Agreement was
supposed to help solve this problem by, among other measures, prohibiting states that
do not abide by the regime of the regional ﬁshery organization from ﬁshing the resource.
But it is almost impossible to prohibit any state from ﬁshing on the high seas let alone
within waters under its own jurisdiction. Perhaps the next step in trying to protect ﬁsh
stocks from over-exploitation would be to reduce the sovereignty of the coastal state and
transferring it to the RFMOs instead?
The stability of existing coastal state agreements will be put to the test by ﬁsh stocks
changing their distribution in response to climate change. Fish stocks will migrate into
new waters and become available for harvest in EEZs of nonmember nations to the
management agreement of the stock in question, disrupting the balance of the agreed
sharing rule. This might lead to increased ﬁshing pressure as the new coastal states try
to establish so called historical ﬁshing rights. Recently, two other straddling ﬁsh stocks
distributed in the same waters as the blue whiting have experienced this.
As examples of the contemporary problem with straddling, shared stocks in this area,
we have the agreement between the coastal states on the Norwegian Spring-spawning
herring stock. This agreement broke down, and was suspended in 2003 and 2004, when
the stock did not resume its expected migration pattern. Norway, especially, was not
satisﬁed with its share in the ﬁshery when it turned out that the stock actually spent
more time in Norwegian waters then what was expected when the agreement was set up.
Luckily, the dispute did not last long and the stock was in good condition to withstand
an increased ﬁshing pressure for a short while.
Secondly, the Northeast Atlantic mackerel has moved its distribution northwards and
is currently available during summer and autumn in Icelandic waters. Iceland, which
is not a member of the management agreement of this stock, ﬁshed signiﬁcant amounts
of mackerel in 2007 and 2008. This comes in addition to the landings of the member
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countries, leading to a total harvest in excess of the ICES's recommendations for this
stock. Moreover, the Northeast Atlantic mackerel stock is probably in a poorer condition
than the Norwegian Spring-spawning herring was in when its management agreement was
suspended, and when it was renewed, no new members were included.
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